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THE VIRGINIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT PROPOSAL
The ever-expanding volume of appellate litigation in Virginia has en-
gendered a crisis in appellate justice in this state which can be adequately
addressed only by the creation of an intermediate appellate court.1 Not
only is Virginia the most populous state without such an intermediate
court, its highest court also has the largest caseload of any single state
appellate court.2
Legislation to create an intermediate appellate court in the Common-
wealth was introduced at the 1982 session of the Virginia General Assem-
bly,3 based on a proposal drafted by the Judicial Council of Virginia.4 The
purpose of this comment is to discuss Virginia's need for an intermediate
appellate court and to evaluate the Council's proposal in light of the ex-
perience of other states 5 and with reference to current American Bar As-
1. Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia? 57 VA. L. REv. 3, 57-58 (1971).
The number of petitions for appeal has increased 400% over the past 21 years. Virginia
Court Organization Study, A Report of The National Center for State Courts 242 (1979)
(unpublished report prepared for Virginia Judicial Council on file in office of Executive Sec-
retary of Virginia Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Court Organization Study].
2. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 239.
3. Several months after this comment was written, two bills proposing the creation of an
intermediate court, H.R. 454 and H.R. 455, were introduced before the House of Delegates'
Committee on Courts of Justice. Action on these bills was unknown at the time of
publication.
4. Judicial Council of Virginia Adopts Proposal for Intermediate Appellate Court, 29
VA. B. NEWS 11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Council Proposal]. The Virginia Judi-
cial Council consists of two attorneys qualified to practice in the Virginia Supreme Court,
seven trial court judges, and the chairmen of the Virginia General Assembly House and
Senate Committees for Courts of Justice. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-222 (Repl. Vol. 1975). The
Council is responsible for the continuous study of Virginia's judicial system and is expressly
authorized to consider the creation of an intermediate appellate court. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-
225 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
Virginia's former constitution provided for a temporary lower appellate court to hear
cases assigned to it by the supreme court. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. VI, § 89 (1971). This
court was convened only four times, however, the last time being from 1927 to 1928, and no
provision is made for this court under the revised constitution. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1,
at 47 n.113. See generally Note, The Virginia Special Court of Appeals: Constitutional
Relief for an Overburdened Court, .8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 244 (1967).
5. At present, 32 states have intermediate appellate courts: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
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sociation Standards Relating to Appellate Courts.'
I. THE PRESENT CRISIS IN VIRGINIA
The discretionary nature of most appeals in Virginia7 has enabled the
state's supreme court to process its huge caseload with remarkable effi-
ciency. However, as the number of petitions for appeal has increased,
there has been a corresponding decline in the ability of the supreme court
to perform the two essential functions of appellate review. First, the su-
preme court is responsible for performing the corrective function of re-
viewing trial court decisions for error which results in injustice to the par-
ties.8 Second, the court is responsible for performing the developmental
function of writing opinions which will provide meaningful guidance to
the state's legal community.9 In order to adequately carry out these re-
sponsibilities, the reviewing court must be able to maintain a balance in
the time it devotes to each function. Where such balance is impossible,
these functions become competing rather than complementary duties.
The result is likely to be an endless cycle in which the incidence of error
in the trial courts increases as the clarity and coherence of the precedent
guiding them decreases.
Because of the ever-increasing number of petitions for appeal, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court faces precisely this kind of situation.10 Clarity and
see, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. M. OSTHUS, STATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS
20-23 (rev. ed. 1980). Over half of these courts were created after 1960, and seven of these
have been established since 1976. See Blair & Flango, Creating an Intermediate Appellate
Court: Does It Reduce the Caseload of a State's Highest Court? 64 JUDICATURE 74, 77
(1980).
6. ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
7. Appeal is only by leave of the supreme court unless an appeal as of right is expressly
provided by statute. See W. BRYSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 173 (1979). Com-
pare, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (civil appeals) and 19.2-317 (Repl.
Vol. 1975) (criminal appeals) with 12.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (appeals from State Corporation
Commission) and 17-110.01 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (appeal of death sentence).
Petitions for appeal are decided upon by panels consisting of three or four justices. If
leave to appeal is granted, the case is heard by the full court. The panels review petitions on
their merits on the basis of a full record, briefs and oral argument by the petitioner if re-
quested. P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 132-33 (1976);
Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 256-57. See-also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6,
at § 3.10, Commentary. The panels grant petitions whenever the trial court's decision
presents "a substantial possibility of injustice." Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 701, 204
S.E.2d 421, 424 (1974) (rejecting due process attack on discretionary appeal procedure).
8. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.00, Commentary.
9. Id.
10. According to the National Center for State Courts, Virginia's "constantly rising appel-
210 [Vol. 16:209
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coherence in rulings must be sacrificed if justice is to be done, as it must
be, in cases of little interest to anyone other than the immediate parties.1 '
The court simply cannot afford to prevent error by selecting and devoting
time to cases which would give it an opportunity to clarify or revise ex-
isting law. 2 To do so would require sacrificing the rights of parties whose
appeals would be rejected in order to keep the court's caseload within
manageable bounds. This price would be too great.
A more serious concern is that the supreme court is becoming increas-
ingly less accessible to litigants.'3 Indeed, it is questionable whether the
court currently gives petitions for appeal the careful judicial review re-
quired by ABA Standards."4 Thus an intermediate appellate court is des-
late caseload . .. has rendered this system unworkable, and an intermediate court is now
required." Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 253. The commentary to ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, points out that the discretionary appeal procedure, because it
permits the court to deny review, often masks the symptoms of an appellate crisis: "[Sluch
an arrangement may persist long after the point has been reached when an intermediate
appellate court should have been established. Moreover, internal inconsistency in the court's
decisions may be ignored or tolerated to an excessive degree in the hope of avoiding the cost
of establishing an intermediate court."
11. [Tlhe quality of appellate justice is to a large degree determined by the attention
given to the merits of cases that are of little interest to anyone but the immediate
parties. All appellate courts should remain mindful that every case, whether it has
general importance or not, is important to the immediate litigants.
ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 3 (Introduction).
12. Four justices have "expressed concern that they do not have enough time to research
issues and prepare opinions adequately to perform the Court's law-making function." Court
Organization Study, supra note 1 at 257.
13. While the number of petitions for appeal has increased 400%, the number of appeals
granted has declined from about 40% in the late 1950's to about 13% in the late 1970's. Id.
14. Id. at 256. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.10(a), requires that litigants generally
be accorded an appeal of right from the trial level. The commentary to this section, how-
ever, indicates that discretionary review procedures are acceptable if the litigant has the
rights to: (1) present the record of the proceedings below, (2) submit written argument in
the form of briefs, (3) present oral argument except in cases where it has so little utility that
it may justly be denied, and (4) thoughtful consideration of the merits of the case by at least
three judges of the court. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.10(a), Commentary.
With regard to the fourth element, the ABA STANDARDS require that "[e]ach judge who is
to participate in deciding an appeal should read the briefs and become familiar with the
record, the parties' contentions, and the principal authorities relevant to the questions
presented." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.34. This requirement applies to delibera-
tions on the question of whether to grant discretionary appeal. ABA STANDARDS, supra note
6, at § 3.34, Commentary. The National Center for State Courts has found indications that
the fourth element is lacking. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 249. At present,
"[t]he justices usually do not read the briefs or records, relying on the memoranda [pre-
pared by a law clerk or staff attorney] and on oral argument [only the petitioner may argue
orally] for information about the facts and the parties' contentions." Id.
1981]
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perately needed, not only to allow more time for careful exposition of the
law, but also to assure meaningful judicial review of the merits of each
case that is appealed on the basis of error.
The addition of an intermediate appellate court would give Virginia's
judicial system the capacity necessary to perform the two essential func-
tions of appellate review. The primary role of the intermediate court
would be to perform the corrective function of remedying trial court er-
ror. 5 The Supreme Court of Virginia then would be able to concentrate
primarily on the developmental function of establishing a uniform body
of case law.16 It could be more selective in accepting appeals and could
devote more time to those cases without jeopardizing the rights of other
litigants.
II. OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
There are four principal objections to the creation of an intermediate
court. It has been argued that the addition of a lower appellate court
would: 1) encourage appeals;'7 2) increase the delay and expense involved
in appeals;' s 3) undermine the certainty of precedent;19 and 4) cost more
than internal reforms.2 0
Although the addition of an intermediate court undoubtedly would en-
courage appeals from the trial level, one of the basic reasons for creating
an intermediate appellate court is to increase access to the appellate pro-
cess. The current lack of access to appellate review discourages some par-
ties from seeking appeals in cases clearly meriting review.2' An intermedi-
ate court would give Virginia the appellate capacity necessary to afford
deserving parties a greater opportunity to invoke the corrective function
of appellate review. Not all cases, however, would warrant invoking the
developmental function of supreme court review.
The objection that an intermediate court would increase the delay and
15. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459
(1975).
16. See Groot, The Effects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court
Work Product: The North Carolina Experience, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 548, 557 (1971);
Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 270.
17. Blair & Flango, supra note 5, at 76.
18. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 2-3.
19. Id.
20. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, Commentary; Lilly & Scalia, supra note
1, at 21, 28, 34-35; Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 269.
21. "[M]any cases [are] not now appealed . . . because of the foreknowledge that the
Supreme Court will not accept review. . . ." Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 58.
[Vol. 16:209
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expense involved in taking an appeal rests on the assumption that two
levels of appellate courts would result in two appeals in every case. Statis-
tics from states having intermediate courts indicate that this assumption
is not valid.22 Many litigants are apparently satisfied with one appeal. In
addition, when relieved of their responsibility for performing the correc-
tive function of appellate review, state supreme courts may be more selec-
tive in accepting cases for review. Finally, the appellate system can be
structured to eliminate the need for double appeals by directing cases
presenting issues of major public importance or involving novel legal
questions to the supreme court for decision in the first instance.23
Decisional conflict within an appellate system would, of course, under-
mine the certainty of precedent. However, two-level appellate systems
can be structured to minimize the risk of such conflict by permitting the
intermediate court to decide cases en banc and by providing for supreme
court review where necessary to maintain decisional uniformity.24 More-
over, any conflicts which did arise would serve as helpful indicators to the
supreme court of areas of the law in need of clarification or revision.
Creating an intermediate appellate court would cost more than such
internal reforms as increasing the size of the supreme court, using panels
of justices to hear appeals, expanding the role of staff attorneys, or using
commissioners to write opinions.25 None of these measures, however,
would improve the quality of justice and case law in Virginia or would
comport with ABA Standards. The first two alternatives simply would
not be adequate to cope with the present appellate caseload crisis26 and
would impair the supreme court's ability to perform its developmental
function. Increasing the size of the court might impair the effectiveness of
conference deliberations and increase the number of dissenting opin-
ions.2 7 Likewise, the use of three- or five-judge panels to decide appeals
22. OsTHus, supra note 5, at 3. Recent studies indicate that in states having two level
appellate systems, supreme court review is sought in only about 40% of the cases decided by
the intermediate court and is granted by the supreme court in only about 15% of these
cases. Marvell, The Problem of Double Appeals, 1979 APPELLATE ADVOCACY REV. 23; Court
Organization Study, supra note 1, at 264.
23. Although Blair & Flango, supra note 5, at 84, conclude that creating an intermediate
court seems to increase the overall number of appeals from the trial level, they do concede
that the addition of such a court can reduce the caseload of the supreme court if the inter-
mediate court is given the appellate jurisdiction and membership necessary to accommodate
the increase in initial appeals from the trial level.
24. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 10, 14.
25. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 262-63. For a detailed evaluation of each
of these alternatives see Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 21-42.
26. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 262.
27. The Virginia Supreme Court currently has seven members. The ABA has endorsed
1981]
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could prevent the collective professional and intellectual resources of the
entire court from being brought to bear upon the development of the
law.28 Perhaps the greatest risk in using panels is that such use could
create internal conflict in the court's decisions. This would be intolerable
at the supreme court level. Even if the court reheard en banc decisions
which reflected a lack of uniformity between panels, the danger of inter-
nal inconsistency would continue to exist.
The two remaining alternatives would involve unacceptable delegation
of the judicial function. Staff attorneys already play a major role in the
petition for appeal process, in contravention of ABA Standards.2 The use
of commissioners to hear appeals and help write opinions would also vio-
late these standards.3 0
The costs involved in creating an intermediate court could be mini-
mized by utilizing, to the extent possible, existing administrative facilities
and personnel. 1 Centralized administration of the intermediate court to-
gether with divisional sitting would maximize the efficient use of available
judicial and administrative resources. Although some additional expendi-
tures may be required, an even greater cost will be imposed on the Com-
monwealth in terms of the declining quality of appellate justice in Vir-
ginia if the two-tier appellate system is not adopted. In the words of
several commentators, this is "a price . ..which most Americans and
their lawyers would or should be unwilling to bear."32
III. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT PROPOSAL
The addition of an intermediate level of appeals in Virginia would re-
quire careful planning of the intermediate appellate court's organization,
jurisdiction, and relationship to the state supreme court. The effective-
ness of the intermediate court in reducing the delay and expense involved
in the appellate process and in providing docket relief to the supreme
court turns upon these three features. The thirty-two states with two-
tiered appellate systems vary significantly in terms of these three central
five- to nine-member appellate courts. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01,
Commentary.
28. The ABA STANDARDS recommend against divisional sitting of the supreme court. ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01.
29. The court's reliance upon staff-prepared memoranda in deciding on whether to grant
leave to appeal violates ABA STANDARDS §§ 3.10 and 3.34. See note 14 supra.
30. "The court should not . . .delegate its deliberative and decisional functions to of-
ficers such as commissioners." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01(2).
31. See Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 282-84.
32. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 133.
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features. The intermediate courts in these states also have demonstrated
differing levels of effectiveness in increasing access to the appellate pro-
cess and in providing docket relief for the supreme court.33 Thus, the
merits of the Judicial Council's proposal for improving Virginia's appel-
late system may be evaluated against the backdrop of the experiences of
other states and the standards which have been formulated by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in light of those experiences.
A. Organization of the Proposed Intermediate Appellate Court
The Council's proposed intermediate appellate court would consist of
four divisions, with three judges assigned to each division.3 4 One division
would sit in Richmond, and the others would sit at locations designated
by the supreme court to provide convenient geographical access to the
appellate process.3 5 The court would be centrally administered and would
have a single clerk, whose office would be located in Richmond.36
The membership of each division of the court would rotate on the basis
of assignment by its chief judge,37 and he would also assign cases among
divisions. 38 Generally the divisions would function independently of each
other, deciding both petitions for appeal and appeals granted.39 However,
upon motion the court would be required to rehear en banc the decision
of any division in which there was a dissenting opinion. An en banc re-
hearing would also be held upon certification by any intermediate court
judge that a division's ruling conflicted with a prior decision of a division,
the intermediate court sitting en banc, or the supreme court.40
33. See Blair & Flango, supra note 5.
34. Judicial Council Proposal, supra note 4, at 11-15 (reprinting Judicial Council of Vir-
ginia, A Bill to Amend Title 17 of the Code of Virginia by Adding thereto Chapter 3.1
Providing for a Court of Appeals, §§ 17-116.01 to -116.02 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Judi-
cial Council Bill]).
35. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.02(2).
36. Id. at § 17-116.013.
37. Section 17-116.02(b) of the Council's proposal authorizes the chief judge to assign
members to divisions and imposes no local residency requirements for judges. Although this
section does not expressly require rotating membership, such membership is recommended
by § 3.01(b) of the ABA STANDARDS and by the National Center for State Courts. Court
Organization Study, supra note 1, at 284. The majority of states with intermediate courts
employ rotating membership at the intermediate level. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 13.
38. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.02(a).
39. Id. at § 17-116.02(c).
40. The Council's proposal provides that:
The Court of Appeals shall sit en banc at such place as the Chief Judge shall direct
and the Court shall rehear the decision of any division upon the motion of a party or
upon its own motion (1) when there is a dissent in the division to which the case was
1981]
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On the whole, the Council's proposal follows the recommendations of
the ABA and the organizational model used by a majority of the states
which have intermediate courts. The actual number of judges at the in-
termediate level varies among states, depending upon the size of a state's
population, geographical area, appellate caseload, and whether the inter-
mediate court sits divisionally. However, states similar to Virginia in
these respects typically have twelve judges at the intermediate level.4 In
addition, to maximize appellate capacity, the majority of states authorize
the intermediate court to sit in divisions of three to five judges each.42
The states vary significantly, however, with regard to the jurisdiction of
such divisions and the permanency of their membership.
Divisional sitting creates the risk of decisional conflict among divisions.
To minimize this risk, five states permanently divide the intermediate
court into a civil and criminal division.43 While this model eliminates the
risk of express decisional conflict between divisions, the permanency of
the divisions may result in the development of divergent judicial philoso-
phies and procedural policies. Where permanent divisions are employed,
the need for supreme court supervision to develop a uniform approach to
all cases is increased. 4 4 Moreover, because appellate judges generally con-
sider criminal cases "the dullest, least challenging and most repetitive
component of their business,"'" first-rate judges may not be attracted to
the permanent criminal divisions created under this model.
Most states provide for the sitting of divisions at convenient geographi-
cal locations as a means of increasing the accessibility of the appellate
process. 6 Among these states, two basic organizational models are used:
1) divisions with statewide jurisdiction and rotating membership; 3 and 2)
originally assigned, or (2) when any judge of any division shall certify that in his
opinion any decision of such division of the court is in conflict with a prior decision of
the court or of any division thereof or of the Supreme Court.
Id. at § 17-116.02(d). See VA. CONST. art VI, § 2; VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:3. The proposal does not
clarify whether this requirement applies to a division's decision on petitions for appeal.
41. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 280-82. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16
(Repl. Vol. 1981).
42. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 20-23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01 requires at least three judges per division.
43. The states creating permanent civil and criminal divisions in their intermediate courts
are Alabama, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and Tennessee. In addition, Alaska's interme-
diate court has only criminal jurisdiction. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 26, 40-44, 50.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 38.
46. See OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 13. See generally U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SUR-
VEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION (1973).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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divisions with geographically limited jurisdiction and permanent
membership."
The Council's proposal adopts the first model, which is recommended
by the American Bar Association. 49 Statewide jurisdiction gives the inter-
mediate court the flexibility necessary to accommodate caseload varia-
tions and is conducive to centralized administration. The number of ap-
peals arising within a particular region of a state may vary, both within
the region and in relation to other regions.50 With statewide jurisdiction,
cases can be allocated among divisions to achieve relatively equal
caseloads, and divisions can be assigned to the areas where they are
needed most. Without this flexibility, the time required for disposition of
cases could vary greatly among divisions, resulting in unequal treatment
of litigants.5 '
Rotating membership reduces the risk of decisional conflict by prevent-
ing divisions from becoming separate courts with different judicial philos-
ophies and procedural policies. 52 The development of separate courts
would undoubtedly make litigants feel that they were being treated un-
equally and increase the need for supreme court supervision. 3 While ro-
tating membership would require some travel on the part of judges, oral
argument and decisional conferences could be held by telephone where
feasible.5 '
The second model, which limits a division's jurisdiction to a statutorily
defined geographic area and provides for permanent membership would
allow each division to develop a local character and would require less
travel by judges.55 The permanency of divisions, however, could produce
both administrative and decisional disunity. In addition, this model
would probably require the creation of a separate clerk's office for each
division.56 While a single clerk is conceivable, such an arrangement would
entail extensive mailing between the clerk's office and distant divisions.
Another administrative problem would be a lack in the flexibility neces-
48. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1-2-2 (Burns 1980).
49. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01(b).
50. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 278.
51. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, Commentary.
52. Id.
53. Id. See OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 6.
54. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.36, Commentary; ABA TASK FORCE ON APPEL-
LATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 99
(1977).
55. Letter from Tidewater Region of Circuit Court Judges' Study Commission to Judicial
Council of Virginia 2-3 (July 13, 1981) (recommending second model).
56. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 278.
1981]
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sary to accommodate variations in caseload. Most serious is the risk that
a particular division would consistently disagree with other divisions, a
result which would produce utter chaos in Virginia if the rehearing en
banc requirement is retained.
One of the most unique and potentially problematic features of the
Council's proposal is the requirement of rehearing en banc. Only a few
states provide for such rehearing, 57 and the American Bar Association
recommends against its frequent use.58 In the states where it may be
used, the rehearing en banc is not required. Rather, it is an extraordinary
proceeding to be authorized only where a majority of the intermediate
court agrees that it is necessary to maintain decisional uniformity.5 Par-
ties may request a rehearing en banc, 6" but neither a single party nor a
judge can require the intermediate court to disrupt its proceedings to
hold the rehearing. Under the Council's proposal, a single judge would
have this power, either by dissent or by certification of decisional conflict.
A party could obtain the rehearing merely upon a proper motion.
The justification for rehearing en banc is that it would give intermedi-
ate court decisions the uniformity and precedential value necessary for
these decisions to be final."s A decision by the majority of the intermedi-
ate court would have more weight than the split decision of a single divi-
sion. In cases where the supreme court agreed with the majority, a double
appeal would not be necessary. Even if it did not agree, the supreme
court would have the benefit of the views expressed by the intermediate
court judges. Finally, in cases where the supreme court's discretion to re-
view intermediate court decisions is limited or nonexistent, an en banc
rehearing would be essential to securing a uniform body of case law.
The most significant drawbacks of rehearing en banc are its disruptive
and delaying consequences. An en banc rehearing would require the filing
of additional briefs and copies of the trial record to accommodate the
larger number of judges. It would also disrupt routine divisional proceed-
57. See, e.g., FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(c); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-403 (Repl.
Vol. 1980). A few states permit rehearings en banc where it appears a division's decision
may conflict with precedent. See, e.g., Ky. Civ. R. 1.030(7)(d). The Commentary to ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, states that "[tihe en banc hearing mechanism is...
unnecessary and inappropriate in most state appellate court systems."
58. "[En banc hearings should be kept to a minimum because they impose a heavy bur-
den on the court's time and, if held after a panel's decision, impose an additional burden on
litigants." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, Commentary.
59. See, e.g., FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(c).
60. Id.
61. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.01, Commentary.
218 [Vol. 16:209
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ings when the judges convened en banc at a central location.2 In addi-
tion, rehearing en banc is likely to be more cumbersome and less effective
than appeal to the supreme court. If conflicting interpretations of law
arose among the divisons, only the state supreme court could definitively
resolve the matter.
Even if the mechanism secures the finality of intermediate court deci-
sions and eliminates double appeals, requiring rehearing en banc at the
motion of a party or on the basis of the action of a single judge is not a
sound way to secure its benefits. The requirement provides a built-in dil-
atory tactic, especially for defendants who hope to pressure their oppo-
nents into settlement as an alternative to prolonged litigation. If provi-
sion for rehearing en banc is retained, the decision to hold such a
rehearing should be made by a majority of the intermediate court and
should be authorized only where necessary to secure decisional uniform-
ity. Further restricting the procedure to cases in which no appeal from
the decision of the intermediate court is allowed would optimize its use.
B. The Nature of Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court
Under the Judicial Council's proposal, appeal to the intermediate court
would be discretionary, as are most appeals to the Virginia Supreme
Court under the present system.6 3 Petitions would be heard by a division
of the court and would be granted if one judge found that full scale re-
view was warranted. The decision to reject a petition would have to be
unanimous.64
Unlike the Council's proposal, all states with intermediate courts ac-
cord civil and criminal litigants at least one appeal from the final judg-
ment of a trial court of record as a matter of right.6 5 The primary justifi-
cation for the discretionary appeals process in Virginia has been the
necessity of enabling the supreme court to manage its huge caseload.66
The addition of an intermediate court, however, would eliminate this ra-
tionale. It would also allow Virginia to conform to current, national stan-
dards of fairness, under which "it is almost axiomatic that every losing
62. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(c); Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.02(d).
63. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.05(a)-(b). See also authorities cited in
note 7 supra.
64. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.07(a).
65. Virginia and West Virginia, neither of which have intermediate courts, are the only
two states which do not provide at least one appeal as a matter of right. Court Organization
Study, supra note 1, at 239.
66. See Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 57-58; Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at
253.
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litigant in a one-judge court ought to have a right of appeal to a multi-
judge court. . . [as] a protection against error, prejudice, and human fail-
ings in general."67
The major objections to an appeal of right are that it will lead to frivo-
lous appeals and cause needless delay and expense.6 8 The first objection is
easily countered in view of the authority of virtually all appellate courts
to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals.69 The second objection correctly
identifies the primary value of the discretionary appeal process from the
judicial perspective-its efficiency. Without question, the court's sum-
mary procedures for reviewing petitions save time. The real issue, how-
ever, is whether these procedures are worth the cost they impose upon
litigants.
From the litigant's perspective, the discretionary appeal process is both
unfair and costly. For the litigant whose appeal is denied, there is an im-
plication that his case is not worthy of the same careful judicial consider-
ation given to appeals which are granted.70 Although the process costs
him as much as an appeal of right, he obtains much less in terms of judi-
cial review. He must finance his attorney's presentation of a full record, a
67. B. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 4 (1976). But see
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (states not constitutionally required to provide for
appeals).
The Virginia Trial Lawyer's Association Committee on Federal and State Courts cur-
rently seeks to form an ad hoc committee composed of members from each of Virginia's four
bar groups-the Virginia Trial Lawyer's Association, the Virginia Bar Association, the Vir-
ginia State Bar Committee and the Virginia Association of Defense Attorneys-to try and
develop an intermediate court proposal which would satisfy the members of all four groups.
One of this committee's central concerns will be to secure appeal as a matter of right to the
intermediate court. Telephone conversation with F. Rodney Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the
Virginia Trial Lawyer's Association Committee on Federal and State Courts (Sept. 22,
1981). The National Center for State Courts has also recommended an appeal as of right to
the intermediate court. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 271.
A possible compromise between appeal as of right and appeal by leave of court is found in
those states which make interlocutory appeals discretionary and permit appeal as of right
only from final judgments. See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(b); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 307. ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.12(b), recommends that interlocutory appeals be discretion-
ary to insure that litigation is not unnecessarily protracted. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670(B)
(Repl. Vol. 1977) currently provides for discretionary review of specified equitable interlocu-
tory decrees.
68. Telephone conversation with F. Rodney Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the Virginia Trial
Lawyer's Association Committee on Federal and State Courts (Sept. 22, 1981).
69. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 38; ALA. R. APP. P. 38; OHIO R. APP. P. 23; PENN. R. APP. P.
2761.
70. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 133; Court Organiza-
tion Study, supra note 1, at 272.
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written brief, and oral argument.7 1 However, it is likely that only his oral
argument will reach the justices.72 The litigant whose appeal is granted is
also hurt by the process. He must finance the presentation of not only a
full record, but also two formal briefs, an appendix, and two oral argu-
ments.7 3 For him, the current process is as expensive as a double appeal.
Discretionary appeal to the intermediate court could require a party to
finance four stages of briefing and argument.
An appeal of right would enhance the litigant's perception of the appel-
late process as responsive to his needs and would reduce the drain on his
financial resources. Of greater significance, an appeal of right would allow
the litigant to determine whether the trial court's decision would receive
full scale judicial review, subject to the power of the court to impose sanc-
tions where this right was clearly abused. Finally, the efficient use of judi-
cial resources is possible under an appeal of right process. Such efficiency
could be maximized by permitting the intermediate court to sit in divi-
sions, to dispense with oral argument in cases where it clearly would not
be helpful, and to state the grounds for its decisions in short, informal
opinions which would not be published. 4 Other time-saving measures are
also available, such as pre-disposition conferences to limit the issues on
appeal.75
C. Jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court
1. Original Jurisdiction
The Judicial Council's proposed intermediate court would have juris-
diction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition against circuit
71. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:8, 5:21, 5:28.
72. It has been noted that "[t]he justices usually do not read the briefs or records." Court
Organization Study, supra note 1, at 249.
73. Parties may not adopt the briefs used at the petition stage for use in the full appeal
stage. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:42. Nor can the record be used. The appellant must prepare a
formal appendix containing relevant parts of the record which is presumed complete. VA.
Sup. CT. R. 5:35, 5:37. Although oral argument may be waived, most attorneys naturally do
not do so for fear of prejudicing their client's case.
74. LILLY, GRAHAM C., THE APPELLATE PROCESS AND STAFF RESEARCH ATITORNEYS IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 1972-73 (1974); OKSMAN, G. TIMOTHY, THE APPELLATE PROCESS
AND STAFF RESEARCH ATTORNEYS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA: A REPORT OF THE AP-
PELLATE JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 1973-74 (1975).
75. Many states permit conferences with an intermediate court judge to simplify the is-
sues and procedure on appeal. See, e.g., Ky. Civ. R. 76.14. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at
§ 3.53, recommends the use of such conferences.
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judges1 6 and to issue writs of habeas corpus against any governmental of-
ficial. 7 Each judge would also have the authority to summarily review a
circuit court's action respecting an injunction .7
In providing the intermediate court with co-extensive original and ap-
pellate jurisdiction, the Council's proposal conforms both to the practice
of the majority of states with intermediate courts79 and to ABA Stan-
dards.8 0 However, the proposal does not adequately explain the relation-
ship between the original jurisdiction of the intermediate court and that
of the supreme court. This relationship should be clarified so that initial
appeals may be filed in the proper court. The need for such clarification
might arise, for example, where an intermediate court refused to issue a
writ, or if a judge of that court refused to review a circuit court's action
on an injunction.81
Most states require that a litigant initially seek a writ from the court
which would have initial appellate jurisdiction over a final judgment in
his case 2 and specify that appeal to the supreme court is the appropriate
remedy where the intermediate court refuses to issue the desired writ."
Absent such clarification, petitions and briefs could be filed simultane-
ously or successively in the intermediate court and the supreme court,
76. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.04.
77. Id.
78. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-626 (Repl. Vol. 1977) authorizes a single supreme court jus-
tice to summarily review a circuit court's orders with regard to an injunction. Also, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides for an ordinary discretionary appeal from such
orders. The authority conferred by § 8.01-626 is classified under the Council's proposal as
part of the original jurisdiction of the intermediate court. To date, the relationship between
§§ 8.01-626 and 8.01-670 has not been clarified. See Hartnett, Extraordinary Writs and
Unusual Appeals - State and Federal Courts, in APPELLATE PRACTICE SEMINAR - VIRGINIA
AND FEDERAL, 11-9 to 1I-11 (1981).
79. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 4. Most states, however, do not limit the intermediate court's
jurisdiction to issuing writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Such a limitation is desirable
to avoid congestion in the intermediate court. Hufstedler, Constitutional Revision and Ap-
pellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. REv. 577, 598 (1969).
80. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.00(a)(2).
81. Section 17-116.07 of the Council's proposal provides that the intermediate court's de-
cision is to be final in certain types of cases. It is not clear whether appeal to the supreme
court will be available from the intermediate court's action respecting extraordinary writs
sought in such cases. Section 17-116.07 provides for finality only where the intermediate
court "has rejected a petition for appeal or has granted and decided an appeal." Judicial
Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.07. Thus, it would seem that the finality created by
the provision could easily be circumvented by seeking appeal from the intermediate court's
action pursuant to its original jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 110-22 infra.
82. See, e.g., N.C. R. APP. P. 22(a).
83. See, e.g., Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.36(6).
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creating unnecessary expense and duplication of effort."'
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
Under the Council's proposal, the intermediate court's appellate juris-
diction would encompass all cases in which appeal to the supreme court is
currently discretionary.8 5 Thus, all appeals from the circuit courts and the
Virginia Industrial Commission" would lie in the intermediate court. The
direct appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court would be confined to
the narrow class of cases in which appeal is currently of right.8 7 This cate-
gory includes appeals from the State Corporation Commission, appeals
from the circuit courts in capital cases, and appeals from the special
three-judge tribunal in disbarment proceedings.8 "
If the proposal is adopted, most appeals would be taken initially to the
intermediate court. The intermediate level of appeal could be bypassed,
however, through an order of "certification" issued by the supreme court.
A party wishing to bypass the intermediate court could file a motion for
certification in the supreme court. The proposal would also allow the in-
termediate court itself to request certification of an appeal. A request for
certification by a party or the intermediate court could be granted if the
case involved either a "substantial question of constitutional law," a cir-
cuit court's decision that a statute is unconstitutional, or a legal principle"of major significance to the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth that
[has] not been previously decided by the Supreme Court." However, the
supreme court, upon its own motion, would be authorized to certify any
case.8 9
Thus, the Council's proposal would give the intermediate court broad
appellate jurisdiction, subject to the authority of the supreme court to
certify cases for direct review. In this respect, the proposal conforms to
the jurisdictional model which has proven most effective in states with
intermediate courts 0 and has been recommended by the American Bar
84. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(e) Committee Notes.
85. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.05(a)-(b). See authorities cited in
note 7 supra.
86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-98 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at
§ 17-116.05(c).
87. See authorities cited in note 7 supra. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(5) (Repl. Vol.
1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (appeals in disbarment proceedings).
88. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.05(b).
89. Id. at § 17-116.06.
90. See OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 7. Studies have shown that a broad jurisdictional grant
is most effective in reducing supreme court congestion. Id.; Blair & Flango, supra note 5, at
84.
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Association."'
As previously noted, double appeals may occur in a two-level appellate
system where the jurisdictional boundaries of the courts overlap. To
avoid this problem, a preliminary sorting process should be established to
direct cases of great legal or public significance to the supreme court. The
process should be relatively simple and clear-cut in order to avoid juris-
dictional conflicts.
Subject matter and amount classifications (e.g. the involvement of a
constitutional issue or specific amount of money) should not be used to
define the intermediate court's initial appellate jurisdiction: "Subject
matter and monetary divisions, which generally represent an attempt at
winnowing out the cases of importance, are simply not effective in doing
SO."'92 Moreover, imprecise classifications may lead to jurisdictional dis-
putes and confusion. Recognizing the inaccuracy and imprecision of such
classifications, many states have given their intermediate courts the broad
appellate jurisdiction recommended by the American Bar Association. 3
With a few specific and narrowly drawn exceptions, all appeals in these
states must be taken initially to the intermediate court.94 As indicated
above, the Council's proposal for an intermediate court in Virginia adopts
this model. The exceptions suggested by the proposal for direct supreme
court jurisdiction in capital cases, disbarment proceedings, and appeals
from the State Corporation Commission are sufficiently precise to prevent
dispute.95
The majority of states with intermediate courts also have adopted some
form of the certification process described above, which allows bypassing
of the intermediate court in certain cases so that the state supreme court
may have direct appellate review in these matters.9 The bypass mecha-
nism can facilitate the prompt consideration of cases whose legal signifi-
91. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.00(a)(2).
92. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 49 (emphasis in original).
93. The states which follow the ABA recommendation include Arizona, California, Flor-
ida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See OsTHus, supra note 5, at 27-29, 31, 33-37,
39, 40-41, 45. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.00(a)(2), recommends that there be no
exceptions to the intermediate court's initial appellate jurisdiction.
94. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (Repl. Vol. 1981) (excepting only appeals from
sentence of death or life imprisonment from intermediate court's jurisdiction).
95. See Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.05(c). These cases constitute only
a small portion of the supreme court's current caseload. Court Organization Study, supra
note 1, at 274.
96. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 11. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.10(d), recommends
the use of a bypass mechanism for cases of "great and immediate public importance."
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cance mandates authoritative resolution by the supreme court. The defi-
nition of "legal significance" varies among states, but the criteria for
certification set out in the Council's proposal do not differ materially
from the criteria employed by other jurisdictions. 97
Following the model of most states which utilize a bypass mechanism,
the Council's proposal would give parties to an action the right to request
certification of their appeal to obtain a direct hearing by the state su-
preme court.98 An alternative approach would be to adopt the unique pro-
cedure used by the State of Florida, which gives the intermediate court
shared responsibility for securing the transfer of legally significant cases
to the supreme court for prompt resolution. Under the Florida system, a
party desiring to bypass the intermediate court must first petition that
court. 99 If the intermediate court determines that prompt supreme court
review is warranted, it invokes the supreme court's discretion to accept
the case.100
Florida's procedure is less disruptive to proceedings in both appellate
courts and is less burdensome to the parties.101 The intermediate court,
while familiarizing itself with the case, can conveniently consider the mer-
its of a party's petition for bypass without disrupting its normal appellate
processes. The parties, in the midst of perfecting an appeal in the inter-
mediate court, are not required to file the lengthy petitions necessary to
adequately familiarize the supreme court with the case. In addition, the
supreme court does not have to rule upon all petitions for bypass since it
is aided by the prior determination of the intermediate court.
Florida's procedure does involve the risk that the intermediate court
may fail to request the transfer of some legally significant cases. This risk
97. See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.125(a) ("great public importance" and "great effect on the
administration of justice"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (Repl. Vol. 1981) ("significant public
interest;" "legal principles of major significance;" delay likely to cause "substantial harm;"
and "expeditious administration of justice").
98. Most states limit the supreme court's discretion to authorize the bypassing of the
intermediate court. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 11. Under the Council's proposal, however, the
Virginia Supreme Court may act upon its own motion to certify any case in which the inter-
mediate court has granted leave to appeal. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-
116.06. This provision would allow the supreme court to accept cases where its own caseload
permitted, thereby relieving any backlog which developed at the intermediate level. As in
the Council's proposal, several states also authorize the intermediate court to request certifi-
cation on its own motion. See, e.g., Ky. Crv. R. 76.18(5).
99. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.125.
100. Id.
101. Letter from Tidewater Region of Circuit Court Judges' Study Commission to Judi-
cial Council of Virginia 7-9 (July 13, 1981) (recommending this procedure).
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would be especially serious in Virginia if the Judicial Council's provision
for the finality of intermediate court decisions in certain types of cases is
retained. For cases falling within those categories, the bypass mechanism
would be the supreme court's only opportunity to review legally signifi-
cant issues.'0 2
In a few of the less populous states, all appeals are taken initially to the
state supreme court which then assigns cases either to itself or to the
intermediate court based on the legal significance of the issues in-
volved.103 While this model is probably the most effective way to assure
that the supreme court hears all, and only, legally significant cases,'0 it
leaves that court with the administrative task of sorting through appeals.
In Virginia, this model would do little to alleviate the present appellate
caseload crisis which has been caused by the enormous task of sorting
through petitions for appeal from the trial level. In addition, only routine
cases would be assigned to the intermediate court. Its stature would be
diminished as a result, and judgeships on the court would be less
attractive.Yo5
D. Finality of the Decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court
Under the Council's proposal, the intermediate court's decision to deny
an appeal, as well as its disposition of cases heard on appeal, would be
final and without recourse to supreme court review, in domestic relations
cases, misdemeanor cases involving a monetary sentence, cases originating
before administrative agencies, and civil cases involving less than $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.'06 However, if a case falling within one of
102. See text accompanying notes 106-20 infra. The supreme court's power to act upon
its own motion to certify any case would seem to alleviate this risk by permitting the court
to take jurisdiction of any legally significant case in which the intermediate court failed to
request certification. Whether the supreme court has ultimate authority on jurisdictional
questions should be clarified. See OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 7.
103. In Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa and Oklahoma all appeals are taken initially to the state
supreme court for assignment. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 30, 31, 33, 40. Lilly & Scalia, supra
note 1, at 49, recommended this model for Virginia.
104. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 49.
105. Court Organization Study, supra note 1, at 275.
106. The Council's proposal provides in part:
When the Court of Appeals has rejected a petition for appeal or has granted and
decided an appeal, its decision shall be final without appeal to the Supreme Court in:
(1) cases of divorce, affirmation and annullment of marriage, custody, visitation and
support of minors and spousal support,
(2) misdemeanor cases where the sentence imposed consists only of a fine and costs or
costs alone,
(3) cases originating before any administrative agency, including the Industrial Coin-
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these four categories involved "a substantial constitutional question as a
determinative issue,' 1 07 including cases where a circuit court declared a
statute or ordinance unconstitutional,108 discretionary review by the su-
preme court would be available. In any case not falling within one of the
four categories noted above, discretionary review by the supreme court
could be sought."0 9
The use of subject matter and amount classifications to create four cat-
egories of cases in which the supreme court cannot review the intermedi-
ate court's decisions is perhaps the most problematic feature of Council's
proposal. None of the states with intermediate courts employ such classi-
fications on the broad basis contemplated by the Council's proposal. 0
While finality of intermediate court decisions is essential to achieve dock-
et relief for the supreme court and to avoid the delay and expense of
double appeals, eliminating the supreme court's discretion to grant review
simply because the case involves only small claims or minor penal infrac-
tions is neither a necessary nor a sound way to achieve these aims.
To carry out its responsibilities, the supreme court should have ... author-
ity to review and determine cases involving minor penal infractions or small
claims, for they may present questions that should be resolved as a matter
of public interest or because of their importance in the administration of
justice. Such questions can be important even though they arise in cases
that are otherwise of minor consequence because the law governing such
cases often affects the interests of hundreds or thousands of citizens ....
Attempts to foreclose such review categorically, by making the intermediate
court's decisions unreviewable in specified circumstances, tend to result in
forced or hypertechnical reasoning in the application of the criteria which
determine whether further review may be had.111
mission, and
(4) civil cases where the amount involved ... does not exceed $10,000. Where there
is a judgment in the circuit court of any amount other than costs, the amount of such
judgment shall be deemed to be the amount involved ....
Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.07(a).
107. Id. at § 17-116.07(b).
108. Id. at § 17-116.06.
109. Id. at § 17-116.08.
110. OsTHus, supra note 5, at 9. A few of the states employing permanent civil and crimi-
nal divisions do make the decisions of the criminal division final. See note 117 infra.
111. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.00, Commentary. This section further recom-
mends that "[t]he supreme cout should have authority to review all justiciable controversies
and proceedings, regardless of the subject matter or amount involved." Id.
Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 49, have also pointed out the difficulties involved in using
subject matter and amount classifications:
All tort cases are not of negligible social importance, nor are all cases raising constitu-
tional issues of general public concern-if for no other reason than that the issue is
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As noted previously, subject matter and amount classifications are not
always accurate indicators of the legal significance of a case. Because of
the arbitrary nature of these classifications, a confusing body of case law
regarding their meaning is likely to result. 12 The Council's proposal iflus-
trates this problem. Under the provisions of the proposal, the amount of a
judgment obtained in the trial court will be deemed the amount involved
for purposes of obtaining appellate review. Thus, where the judgment ob-
tained in a civil case is less than $10,000, the decision may be appealed to
the intermediate court, but it will not qualify for subsequent review by
the supreme court because it is not within the proper jurisdictional
amount.
However, consider a situation in which two plaintiffs each seek
$500,000 in damages, but only one of them prevails against the defendant,
obtaining a judgment for $1,000. The plaintiff who lost in the trial court
will be able to seek supreme court review following an adverse decision by
the intermediate court. The partially successful plaintiff will not. Never-
theless, the losing plaintiff's case may turn upon a legally insignificant
evidentiary matter, while the partially successful plaintiff's case may turn
upon the legally significant issue of whether an outmoded rule barring the
substantial recovery sought should be rejected. Similar problems would
undoubtedly arise within the other three categories of finality. Further-
more, because the categories of finality cut across substantive areas of the
law, a uniform body of case law within any of these areas would be diffi-
cult to achieve."l3
frivolous. Likewise, one cannot categorically state that all cases involving real estate
are of grave private concern, while all adoption cases, which have no monetary value,
are necessarily of minimal public consequence. Subject-matter and monetary divi-
sions, which generally represent an attempt at winnowing out the cases of impor-
tance, are simply not effective in doing so. There is, in fact, no manner of doing so
except on a case-by-case basis.
112. Florida's experience is illustrative of the difficulties involved in trying to preclude
supreme court review of intermediate court decisions. See Note, The Erosion of Final Juris-
diction in Florida's District Courts of Appeal, 21 U. FLA. L. R-v. 375 (1969). Constitutional
amendment was necessary to eliminate the confusing body of case law which had evolved
regarding the final jurisdiction of its intermediate courts. FLA. CONsT. art 5, § 3 (1968,
amended 1980). See England, Hunter & Williams, Analysis of the 1980 Jurisdictional
Amendment to Const. Art 5 § 3, 54 FLA. B. J. 406 (1980).
113. In Texas, which permanently divides the intermediate court into a civil and a crimi-
nal division, the decisions of the criminal division are final in appeals under habeas corpus.
Tax. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 44.38 (Vernon 1979). Giving the criminal division's deci-
sions complete finality is problematic since this finality creates two courts of last resort
which may develop divergent approaches to civil and criminal cases in general. The finality
of the criminal division's decisions at least encompasses a relatively well defined substantive
area of the law. Under the Council's proposal, however, final authority would be split within
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The sole exception to the categories of finality under the Council's pro-
posal would be for cases involving a "substantial" constitutional issue, in-
cluding a circuit court's decision that a statute or ordinance is unconstitu-
tional. Although this exception is capable of strained interpretation, it
will not be adequate to protect the supreme court's ability to supervise
the development of state law. For example, a case involving heavy fines
for business-related misdemeanor offenses could be legally significant
without involving a constitutional issue. On the other hand, a felony case
turning upon such factual issues as whether probable cause for arrest ex-
isted may well lack the legal significance necessary to justify supreme
court review. Under the Council's proposal, a business might be forced to
close because of the intermediate court's interpretation of a statute im-
posing fines for certain activities, and yet the company could not seek
supreme court review. In contrast, the felon's largely factual issue could
serve as a basis for seeking such review.
Nor will the certification or bypass mechanism be adequate to protect
the supreme court's ability to perform its developmental function.11 4 The
legal significance of a case may not become apparent until the intermedi-
ate court has decided the issues involved. Indeed, that court's decision
may be the source of the case's significance.11 5 For example, the interme-
diate court could reach a result contrary to the supreme court's interpre-
tation of its prior decisions. A significant issue would then exist, even
though the supreme court, considering the matter at issue to be settled
law, would not otherwise have certified the case for direct review. If the
case fell within one of the categories of finality and lacked a constitu-
substantive areas of the law. For example, the supreme court would define the law for civil
cases involving over $10,000, and the intermediate court would define it for those involving
less than $10,000. Conflict in the law governing all civil cases would be inevitable. See Os-
THUS, supra note 5, at 6.
114. It is not even clear that bypass should be permitted in these cases. Unless the case
involved a substantial constitutional issue or the circuit court's having declared a statute or
ordinance unconstitutional, permitting the intermediate court to be bypassed would seem
inconsistent with the grant of final jurisdiction under § 17-116.07(a) of the Council's
proposal. See OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 12. North Carolina, for example, prohibits bypass in
post-conviction proceedings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (1969) (amended 1977). The inter-
mediate court's decisions had been final in these cases. Id. § 7A-28 (1969) (repealed 1978).
Section 17-116.06 of the Council's proposal, in contrast, does not prohibit bypass in the
cases in which the intermediate court's decision is to be final.
115. Several states authorize discretionary review where the intermediate court certifies
the importance of its decision or where its decision is in conflict with a prior decision of the
supreme court or of the intermediate court. See, e.g., ALA. R. Arp. P. 39(c)(4); ILL. Sup. CT.
R. 316; FLA. APP. R. 9.030(a)(2)(iii); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1981). This
would be an effective alternative to the Council's rehearing en banc requirement. See Judi-
cial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.02(d).
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tional ground for review, the supreme court would be powerless to remedy
the resulting inconsistency between its prior holdings and the decision of
the intermediate court. Certification would not be available, even where
the intermediate court rejected a petition for appeal."1 '
The availability of rehearing by the intermediate court sitting en banc
would not, of course, help the supreme court exert its influence over the
development of state law.11 Where the intermediate court sitting en banc
agreed with a division's erroneous interpretation of the supreme court's
prior decisions, the supreme court would be equally powerless to remedy
the error. Therefore, an exception permitting discretionary review by the
supreme court in cases of major legal significance clearly is necessary to
protect the supreme court's ability to supervise the development of state
law.
In virtually all states, the availability of supreme court review of inter-
mediate court decisions rests primarily in the discretion of the supreme
court.1  Often, the grounds for bypassing the intermediate court are also
grounds for supreme court review of the intermediate court's decisions.119
116. The Judicial Council's proposal permits certification only after the intermediate
court has granted leave to appeal. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.06(a).
117. No state relies solely upon the bypass mechanism to safeguard the supreme court's
ability to supervise the development of state law. The mechanism's utility would be much
greater if it could be employed to transfer cases to the supreme court prior to decision by
the court of appeals sitting en banc, as required by the Council's proposal. Id. at § 17-
116.02(d). Certification is permitted after "an appeal has been awarded by the Court of
Appeals . . . [but] before it has been determined by the Court of Appeals." Id. at § 17-
116.06(a). However, because the intermediate court "shall" sit in divisions which are to de-
termine cases independently of each other, it seems unlikely that the Council intended cer-
tification to be available during the period after decision by a division, but before rehearing
by the court en banc. Id. at § 17-116.02(b)-(c). Even if bypass were available during this
period, it would not permit the supreme court to review the decision of the intermediate
court sitting en banc if the case was classified within a category of finality and did not
involve the constitutional ground for supreme court review. See id. at § 17-116.07.
118. Most states do not limit the supreme court's discretion to review the intermediate
court's decisions. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 10. In those that do, the grounds for discretion-
ary review are calculated to protect the supreme court's supervisory authority. The presence
of decisional conflict or a significant novel issue are the most common grounds for supreme
court review of the intermediate court's decisions. See, e.g., ALA. R. ApP. P. 39; FLA. R. AP.
P. 9.030(a)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c)(3) (1969). Permitting supreme court review on
these grounds would provide an effective alternative to the rehearing en banc required by
the Council's proposal. Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.02(d).
A few states provide for appeal as of right from the intermediate court in certain types of
cases. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1969) (appeal of right where dissent present).
However, requiring supreme court review in other cases, such as those involving legally in-
significant issues is undesirable. OSTHUS, supra note 5, at 9.
119. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1981) with § 7A-
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Knowing it has the discretion to grant review, the supreme court is not
compelled, in ruling upon the bypass motion, to take every case of poten-
tial legal significance away from the intermediate court. Rather, the su-
preme court can give the intermediate court an opportunity to decide the
case correctly. Where the intermediate court decides correctly, further re-
view is unnecessary. Where it does not, the supreme court can remedy the
error and preserve the uniformity of its case law.
Under the Council's proposal, discretionary review by the supreme
court may be sought in any case other than one in which the intermediate
court's decision is to be final. However, the purpose of such review is not
set out. As the foregoing example of the two plaintiffs illustrates, not all
cases in which supreme court review is available involve issues of major
importance to the public or to the administration of justice. In these le-
gally insignificant cases there is no justification for review beyond the in-
termediate appellate level.
A party who has obtained appellate review before an intermediate court
should be permitted to obtain further review in a higher appellate court
only if that court in its discretion determines that the matter involves a
question that is novel or difficult, is the subject of conflicting authorities
applicable within the jurisdiction, or is of importance in the general public
interest or in the administration of justice.120
The supreme court, at the second level of review, should assume that
the intermediate court has adequately performed the corrective function
of carefully reviewing cases for prejudicial errors. Instead of repeating
that function, the supreme court should make legal or public significance
the focus of its review of petitions for appeal from the intermediate court.
This approach would be fostered if some of the indicia of legal or public
significance were specified by statute or court rules. Such specification
would aid parties in recognizing whether their cases warranted supreme
court review and in petitioning for such review where they believed one or
more of the indicia of legal or public significance was present.
The grounds for certification or bypass set out in the Council's proposal
could serve as reliable indicia that supreme court review of the intermedi-
ate court's decision is warranted. In fact, the constitutional issue ground
for bypass or certification is already a ground for seeking discretionary
review in cases where the decision of the intermediate court is to be final.
Permitting discretionary review in cases involving "legal principles of ma-
jor significance to the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth" would make
31(c)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
120. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 3.10(c).
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it clear that legal or public significance would be the focus of the supreme
court's review of petitions for appeal from the intermediate court. In the
post-decision stage, there should be no requirement that the legal princi-
ples involved "have not been previously decided by the Supreme
Court."'1 21 Eliminating this restriction would permit review of decisions
involving legally significant, but not necessarily novel issues. Such a situa-
tion might arise where a litigant urged rejection of an established rule, or
where the intermediate court's decision conflicted with a prior supreme
court decision. Permitting the intermediate court to certify the impor-
tance of its decision would also serve as a helpful ground for invoking the
supreme court's discretion to grant review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Judicial Council's proposal represents a major step toward improv-
ing the quality of appellate justice in Virginia. The proposal focuses pri-
marily on the intermediate court as a source of docket relief for the su-
preme court. However, improving the rights of litigants on appeal and
enhancing the quality of case law available to guide the legal community
are equally important goals of an intermediate court. To achieve these
goals, there should be an appeal of right to the intermediate court. In
addition, the supreme court should have the discretion to grant review of
intermediate court decisions in any case presenting issues of major legal
significance. Clarifying the purpose of supreme court review will help in-
sure that only cases of major legal or public significance reach the high
court.
Avoiding needless delay and expense are also important considerations
involved in planning for an intermediate court. To achieve these aims,
two changes should be made. First, any provision for rehearing by the
intermediate court sitting en banc should be founded upon necessity and
left to the discretion of a majority of the members of that court. Second,
the intermediate court should be given shared responsibility for transfer-
ring cases of major legal significance to the supreme court for direct
review.
Creating an intermediate appellate court will involve complex policy
decisions. The changes generated by the proposed system, if adopted, will
provide greater protection for the rights of litigants on appeal and will
enhance the quality of the case law guiding the legal community. Without
the addition of an intermediate court, the Virginia Supreme Court's dock-
et crisis is not likely to improve. As observed over a decade ago:
121. See Judicial Council Bill, supra note 34, at § 17-116.06(b)(3).
[Vol. 16:209
INTERMEDIATE COURT
The issue is not, really, whether Virginia's appellate system should be
changed. It is changing each year whether we like it or not, and whether we
notice it or not, simply because the Court has the power-and probably the
duty-to adjust its functions so that they remain within the bounds of the
feasible.122
With the court's caseload extending far beyond the bounds of the feasi-
ble, the creation of an intermediate court should not be further delayed.
Martha B. Brissette
122. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 1, at 58.
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